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1 Introduction
In the growth and development accounting literature ever since the seminal work of
Solow (1957), and hence in the bulk of macroeconomic investigations, \technological
progress" has been casually identied with growth of residual productivity, an umbrella
term containing everything that could not be traced back to the accumulation of factors
of production, included in the aggregate production function. It is however uncertain
{ and competing methodologies provide conicting clues on that { what exactly this
production function should be, and what factors it should take as inputs. Seen from
a slightly dierent angle: it remains unsettled, how one should decompose growth in
output per worker into the contributions of\factors"and\technology". The objective of
the current article is to investigate these matters more closely, indicating that valuable
lessons can be learned by macroeconomists from the established productivity analysis
literature.
To this end, we will study the empirical properties of 22 alternative specications
of \technological progress" (i.e., growth of residual productivity): ten versions of total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, and twelve versions of technical change, capturing
technological progress at the World Technology Frontier (WTF), or TFP growth net
of technical eciency changes. The focus of the study will be with 19 high-income
OECD countries in the period 1970{2000. All compared measures will be computed
with the use of data on aggregate inputs (physical capital, human capital, etc.) and
output (GDP) only.
By contrasting the neoclassical growth accounting approach based on the Cobb{
Douglas production function specication1 with nonparametric approaches based on
deterministic frontier models,2 we will show which predictions regarding \technological
progress"across countries are robust to changes in the production function specication,
and which are not. Concurrently, we will also assess the robustness of our conclusions
to changes in the composition of the underlying dataset. To achieve this latter goal, 15
of our 22 measures of technological progress will be based on WTF estimates computed
with an auxiliary use of US state-level data (beside the OECD country-level data). As
demonstrated in a related study (Growiec, 2012), such augmentation of the dataset
is likely to improve the precision of WTF estimates markedly. The current article
conrms that it also has a signicant impact on the implied measures of technological
progress.
1For example, Solow (1957) or Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003).
2For example, Fare et al. (1994), Kumar and Russell (2002), Henderson and Russell (2005),
Jerzmanowski (2007), Badunenko, Henderson and Zelenyuk (2008), or Growiec (2012).
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The key dierence between neoclassical growth accounting and frontier approaches
to the measurement of technological progress lies with the treatment of each country's
technical ineciency of factor use. The growth accounting approach assumes 100%
eciency for all countries in all years. Frontier approaches, on the other hand, relax
this restriction by applying the concept of the WTF. The WTF is dened as maximum
output which could potentially be produced given inputs, and viewed as a function of
the inputs. In the current study, it will be constructed with Data Envelopment Analy-
sis (DEA), one of the most popular methodologies of productivity analysis. Technical
ineciency will then be directly interpreted as distance to the frontier. Having our
constructed WTF in hand, we will also consider a \hybrid" parametric{nonparametric
approach, put forward in the literature on \appropriate technology vs. eciency" de-
compositions (Basu and Weil, 1998; Jerzmanowski, 2007).
One should also be aware of another important dividing line among \technological
progress"measures. Namely, from the established productivity analysis literature (e.g.,
Fare et al., 1994; Ray and Desli, 1997; Maudos, Pastor and Serrano, 2000; Coelli et
al., 2005; Zoo, 2007; O'Donnell, 2009) it follows that there are two distinct groups
of such measures: TFP growth measures, capturing productivity gains actually ob-
tained in a given country (e.g., TFP growth as dened by Solow, 1957; Malmquist
index), and technical change measures, capturing technological progress at the World
Technology Frontier (e.g., potential technical change (PTC) and technical change (TC)
indexes dened in Zoo, 2007). The dierence between these two groups of measures
lies with the treatment of technical eciency changes, i.e., changes in the countries'
distance to the common WTF. TFP growth measures include this component, whereas
technical change indexes leave it out, as demonstrated in the following output growth
decomposition:
Output growth = Eciency change Technical change| {z }
TFP growth
Factor accum: (1)
By assuming 100% technical eciency of all countries in all years, neoclassical growth
accounting implicitly identies TFP growth with technical change. However, when
technical ineciency is allowed for, the dierence between both measures becomes
important. Our empirical analysis indicates that large discrepancies between the two
groups of measures are visible in terms of almost all analyzed characteristics. Changes
in countries' distance to the WTF turn out to be both sizeable and highly variable,
and thus their appropriate treatment is essential in the assessment of the pace of
technological progress across countries.
Despite all the aforementioned dierences, several unifying theoretical frameworks
have been proposed in the productivity analysis literature, where the neoclassical
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growth accounting approach and the nonparametric frontier analysis can be taken as
special instances. Such encompassing structures are useful for pinpointing the theo-
retical foundations of the alternative approaches to the measurement of technological
progress. In particular, the framework developed by ten Raa and Shestalova (2011)
applies to our case directly.3 Among the four alternative measurement methods con-
sidered in that article, neoclassical growth accounting and the DEA approach are the
only two which do not require any additional data beyond aggregate inputs and output,
thus implicitly conrming our choice of compared measures.
Given this background, the contribution of the current article to the literature is
to:
 discuss formally the methodology behind several alternative empirical approaches
to the measurement of \technological progress" across countries,
 provide a synthetic, numerical assessment of their empirical properties, based on
an international panel dataset encompassing 19 highly developed OECD countries
in the period 1970{2000.
To the latter end, we will compute (i) the fraction of growth in GDP per worker
explained by the technological progress (residual) component in each of the 22 speci-
cations, as well as (ii) the explained fraction of its cross-sectional and intertemporal
variance. We will also calculate the correlations of these residual measures with out-
put growth, and ex post prediction errors when output growth is predicted solely by
the \factor-only component" (i.e., when residual technological progress is set to zero).
Another exercise would be to compute pairwise correlation coecients among our 22
measures of technological progress, to see if they convey essentially the same informa-
tion, or conversely { if the denitional dierences are empirically meaningful.
To our best knowledge, the current paper constitutes the rst attempt to bring
together several alternative methods of measurement of \technological progress" across
countries, with the objective of comparing their empirical properties, considering both
measures based on neoclassical growth accounting (which is still a standard approach
in macroeconomics) and the ones based on nonparametric WTF estimates.
In the end, the lesson from the current study is that the researcher's choice of the
method of measuring technological progress across countries should always be selected
in accordance with the analyzed research question, and the treatment of technical e-
ciency changes should be particularly closely studied. It seems that there is no unique
3Ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) and ten Raa (2005) have provided similar setups, too, but they
focused on the case of a single multisector economy and dened technical ineciency as the scope for
output-enhancing intersectoral reallocation of inputs, instead of the country's distance to the WTF.
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choice which would be empirically \best"; on the contrary, all considered \goodness of
t" measures vary signicantly with changes in methodology: dierent methods are
best in explaining average output growth rates, dierent methods excel in capturing
their variance, etc.
We do not observe any alignment of this sort in the literature, though. Instead,
alternative analytical methods are used for answering the same sets of questions, often
leading to diverging results. For example, methodological dierences between alter-
native decompositions of overall output growth into contributions of physical capi-
tal accumulation, accumulation of other production factors, and residual productivity
growth, seem to merely reect the backgrounds of their authors, either in neoclassical
macroeconomics and/or national accounts (e.g., Jorgenson, 1995, Timmer, Ypma and
van Ark, 2003) or in productivity analysis dealing with rm-level data (e.g., Fare et
al., 1994, Kumar and Russell, 2002).
In the current study we also nd that the precision of WTF estimates matters a lot
for the predicted rates of technological progress, especially if technical change measures
are considered (as opposed to TFP growth measures). Furthermore, the results of our
nonparametric analyses indicate marked departures from (i) full technical eciency,
(ii) the Cobb{Douglas production function specication, and (iii) perfect substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor (see also Growiec et al., 2011 and Growiec, 2012).
As far as the methodology of the current article is concerned, it should be men-
tioned that even though each of our 22 measures of technological progress is based on a
dierent denition and/or dataset, we in fact disregard several alternative methodolo-
gies which could potentially be used for our purposes as well. First of all, we omit the
strand of literature which deals with CES production functions (e.g., Duy and Pa-
pageorgiou, 2000; Antras, 2004; Klump, McAdam and Willman, 2007; Chirinko, 2008;
Leon-Ledesma, McAdam and Willman, 2010). Clearly, relaxing the Cobb{Douglas
production does not imply the need for an immediate jump into the \extreme" non-
parametric DEA case where no explicit functional form of the production function is
assumed. The class of CES production functions is another natural extension of the
Cobb{Douglas baseline. Secondly, we also do not consider stochastic frontier models
here (see e.g., Koop, Osiewalski and Steel, 1999, 2000; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000;
Bos et al., 2010). Adopting a methodology based on such models could however help
us span a natural bridge between simpler approaches based on Cobb{Douglas or CES
production functions, and the nonparametric approaches considered in the current pa-
per.4 Yet another question which ought to be addressed in near future is, how large is
4Another advantage of stochastic frontier models is that they oer both an assessment of distance
of each country to the WTF { a concept which is at heart of the current analysis { and an explicit
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the uncertainty in our nonparametric estimations of the WTF. This question could be
addressed with the use of bootstrap techniques for nonparametric frontier models (see
e.g. Simar and Wilson, 2000; Kneip, Simar and Wilson, 2008; Badunenko, Henderson
and Russell, 2009).
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we specify the 22 alternative
measures of technological progress. In Section 3, we describe our dataset. In Section
4, we provide our main results regarding the empirical properties of each particular
measure of technological progress. Section 5 concludes.
2 Measurement of technological progress
2.1 Technology and technical eciency
Even though in macroeconomics, the term \technological progress" is used in a broad
range of contexts, the productivity analysis literature requires us to be more precise
here. In the current paper, we will therefore always specify if we are talking about mea-
sures of TFP growth (which include technical eciency changes), or technical change
measures (which leave them out).
All denitions will be constructed on the basis of production possibility sets St of
feasible input{output congurations, for t =1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000:
St = f(xt; yt) : xt can produce ytg; (2)
where xt is the vector of inputs (which will be dened for each measure separately), yt
is the country's output (GDP per worker), and St satises Fare and Primont (1995)
axioms for all t. Based on this specication of the world's technology at each given year
t, we can dene the Shephard's output distance function (cf. Zoo, 2007), capturing
the country's distance to the frontier, as:
DtO(xt; yt) = inf

f > 0 : (xt; yt=) 2 Stg (3)
which is linearly homogenous of degree +1 in yt and nonincreasing in xt. IfD
t
O(xt; yt) =
1 then the given country is technically ecient; otherwise it is inecient. The World
statistical treatment of the estimation error { a feat which our methodology does not oer. They also
allow more sophisticated functional forms to be estimated than just Cobb{Douglas or CES: perhaps
the most popular one in this literature is the relatively exible translog production function, allowing
for systematic deviations from constant returns to scale and a constant elasticity of substitution. A
comparison between deterministic nonparametric, and stochastic parametric frontier models should
thus be considered as an important task for further research.
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Technology Frontier (WTF) is a fragment of the boundary of the production possibility
set, for which output is maximized given inputs:
WTF t = f(xt; yt) : DtO(xt; yt) = 1g: (4)
Hence, if a country is technically ecient then it spans (i.e., belongs to) WTFt.
The production possibility set and the WTF for each year t = 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 will be constructed nonparametrically using Data Envelopment
Analysis, the details of which will be discussed in a separate subsection. Alternatively,
in some specications, we will take the neoclassical growth accounting approach which
assumes full technical eciency of each country and a strict functional form of the
aggregate production function. We will also consider a \hybrid"DEA{growth account-
ing approach which retains the Cobb{Douglas production function specication from
growth accounting but uses DEA-based measures of technical eciency.
It is critical to note that with the passage of time, each country will observe three
dierent types of shifts: factor accumulation, shifts of the WTF (i.e., technical change),
and changing distance to the frontier (i.e., eciency change). The exact measurement
of each of those shifts is conditional on the denition of the production technology, or
the construction of St. Thus the computed pace of \technological progress" must also
be conditional on these assumptions.
2.2 The growth accounting approach
The development and growth accounting literature (see e.g., Solow, 1957; Caselli, 2005)
habitually denes total factor productivity (TFP) on the basis of a Cobb{Douglas
production function, computed using either only physical capital and labor, or physical
and (homogenous) human capital as inputs. For country i in year t, TFP (sometimes
referred to as the Solow residual) is then computed as:
Ait =
yit
kit
or Ait =
yit
kith
1 
it
; (5)
where  is most often assumed to take the \consensus" value of 1/3 (Kydland and
Prescott, 1982). Consequently, TFP growth is captured by the gross growth rate of the
Solow residual:
TFPx(i; t  1; t) = yit
yi;t 1

ki;t 1
kit

(6)
or
TFPx(i; t  1; t) = yit
yi;t 1

ki;t 1
kit

hi;t 1
hit
1 
: (7)
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The subscript x refers to the specic choice of variables entering the input vector,
x = (k) or x = (k; h).
This approach requires the researcher to assume the Cobb{Douglas production func-
tion specication, constant returns to scale, and full eciency of all production units
(i.e., countries). Hence, the eciency change component is trivially set to unity, and
TFP growth is equal to technical change, and both of them are equal to output growth
divided by factor accumulation. By the same token, the best practice technology is
identied with the average practice technology here. Yet, if we allow for technical
ineciency in production and relax the restrictions on the functional form of the ag-
gregate production function, then the data may reject these assumptions or at least
indicate some departures from this benchmark. Admitting that multiple methods for
generalizing the growth accounting approach exist in the literature (as discussed in the
Introduction), we limit ourselves to the nonparametric DEA approach which provides
clear-cut implications for the measurement of TFP growth and technical change across
countries.
2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis
Before we can view the technological developments in each country as relative to the
World Technology Frontier (WTF), assuming that there might be some technical inef-
ciency involved in the production process, which itself might be changing over time,
we must rst construct the WTF itself. Knowing the maximum attainable (frontier)
output given factor inputs in country i at time t, denoted as yt (xit), is thus crucial for
obtaining these measures of \technological progress".
To obtain estimates of output at the WTF, i.e., the best-practice production func-
tion, we shall use the nonparametric DEA algorithm, introduced to the context of
cross-country productivity growth analyses by Fare et al. (1994) and followed by,
among others, Kumar and Russell (2002), Henderson and Russell (2005), Jerzmanowski
(2007), Badunenko, Henderson and Zelenyuk (2008), and Growiec (2012). The princi-
pal idea behind DEA is to envelop all data points in the \smallest" convex set and to
infer the production function as a fragment of the boundary of this set for which output
is maximized given inputs, i.e. as a convex hull of production techniques (input{output
congurations) used in the current data. For each country i and period t, DEA provides
a decomposition of output yit:
yit = y

t (xit)DtO(xit; yit); (8)
i.e., into a product of the maximum attainable output given inputs yt (xit) and the
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Shephard output distance functionDtO(x
t; yt) 2 (0; 1], measuring the\vertical"distance
of country i to the technology frontier at time t.
In the current analysis, we assume that technologies that were once available, remain
available forever, and hence we do not allow for technical regress. This requires us to
carry out a sequential WTF construction procedure where for each year t, WTF t is
spanned by observations from all years  = 1970; :::; t.
Since each dataset contains a nite number of data points, one for each territorial
unit and each year, by construction the DEA{based production function will be piece-
wise linear and its vertices will be the actually observed ecient input{output congu-
rations. Given our assumptions, the (output-oriented) deterministic DEA method is a
linear programming technique allowing one nd the Shephard output distance function
DtO(xjt; yjt) for each unit j = 1; 2; :::; I and given t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg in the sample such
that its reciprocal { the Debreu{Farrell eciency index jt is maximized subject to a
series of feasibility constraints (cf. Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 1993):
max
fjt;11;:::;Itg
jt
s.t. jtyjt 
tX
=1
IX
i=1
iyi ;
tX
=1
IX
i=1
ix1;i  x1;jt;
tX
=1
IX
i=1
ix2;i  x2;jt;
... (9)
tX
=1
IX
i=1
ixn;i  xn;jt;
i  0; i = 1; 2; :::; I;  = 1; 2; :::; t;
It is also additionally assumed that
Pt
=1
PI
i=1 i = 1 in the VRS case (variable
returns to scale). Under the CRS (constant returns to scale) assumption, no further
restriction on i 's is necessary.
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Throughout the remaining text, and following Zoo (2007), the Shephard distance
function taking into consideration as benchmark technology the DEA frontier with
VRS will be denoted as DtO(xit; yit), whereas the Shephard distance function from the
5The CRS case is sometimes referred to as CCR in the honor of its authors (Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes, 1978). The VRS case is referred to as BCC (Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, 1984).
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DEA frontier with CRS { as DtO(xit; yit). Both functions coincide only if the true
underlying technology is CRS, which is likely to be roughly true in the case of cross-
country OECD data, but rather not exactly true. Consequently, yt (xit) will denote
the maximum attainable output given the DEA frontier with VRS, and yt (xit) { with
CRS.
The choice of DEA as our WTF construction method was based primarily on the
advantageous fact that it does not require any assumptions on the functional form of
the aggregate production function (provided that it satises the free-disposal property).
Indeed, the usual assumption of a Cobb{Douglas aggregate production function may
lead to marked biases within growth accounting or levels accounting exercises leading
to an overestimation of the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in explaining growth,
as argued by Caselli (2005) and Jerzmanowski (2007), a feature which is avoided when
the DEA approach is adopted.6 Also, it does not require any additional data beside
aggregate inputs and output.
One should also be aware of the limitations of the DEA approach. First, its deter-
ministic character makes it silent on the estimation precision of the aggregate produc-
tion function and of the predicted eciency levels if inputs and outputs are subject to
stochastic shocks. Second, the DEA provides a biased proxy of the actual technological
frontier. In fact, even the most ecient units in the sample could possibly operate with
some extra eciency, since they are themselves aggregates of smaller economic units
and must therefore have some internal heterogeneity. After taking account of that, the
frontier would be shifted upwards; eciency is nevertheless normalized to 100% for the
most ecient units in the sample. Third, the DEA constructs the aggregate production
function basing on the (relatively few) ecient data points. This makes it naturally
sensitive to outliers and measurement error. We deal with this issue very carefully.
2.4 Malmquist indexes and their decompositions
Based on our DEA results, we are able to dene a range of measures of TFP growth
and technical change. The following classication of these measures is based on Zoo
(2007).7 The measures of TFP growth are:
1. The CRS Malmquist productivity index, computed from a production function
6As for the predicted shape of the production function, DEA can only oer its nite-sample,
piecewise linear approximation. With suciently large data samples, however, certain parametric
forms could be tested formally against this approximate DEA-based nonparametric benchmark, such
as the Cobb{Douglas or translog (cf. Growiec et al., 2011).
7See also O'Donnell (2009).
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constructed with the non-parametric DEA algorithm with CRS:
MCRSx (i; t  1; t) =
s
DtO(xit; yit)
DtO(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
Dt 1O (xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
= (10)
=
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
s
yt (xit)
yt 1(xit)
yt (xi;t 1)
yt 1(xi;t 1)
:
The CRS Malmquist index dened above is a geometric average (Fisher ideal
index)8 of CRS Malmquist indexes taking technology at time t and t   1 as the
benchmark technology. It is also a product of the country's eciency ratio at
periods t and t   1, and the technical change (\WTF shift") factor. Intuitively,
it captures technological progress actually observed in a given country, reected
both in the country's progress or regress with respect to the WTF, and the pace
at which the WTF itself is shifted.
As pointed out by several authors (e.g., O'Donnell, 2009; Daskovska, Simar and
Van Bellegem, 2010), the Malmquist index is not multiplicatively complete (cir-
cular), that is, in generalMCRSx (i; t 2; t) 6=MCRSx (i; t 2; t 1)MCRSx (i; t 1; t).
2. The VRS Malmquist productivity index, computed from a production function
constructed with the non-parametric DEA algorithm with VRS:
MV RSx (i; t  1; t) =
s
DtO(xit; yit)
DtO(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
Dt 1O (xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
(11)
=
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
s
yt (xit)
yt 1(xit)
yt (xi;t 1)
yt 1(xi;t 1)
:
Again, the VRS Malmquist index dened above is a geometric average (Fisher
ideal index) of VRS Malmquist indexes taking technology at time t and t  1 as
the benchmark technology. The dierence is that this time we allow for variable
returns to scale.
The VRS Malmquist index is not multiplicatively complete (circular) either, that
is, in general MV RSx (i; t  2; t) 6=MV RSx (i; t  2; t  1) MV RSx (i; t  1; t).
The measures of technical change are the following:
8See e.g., Henderson and Russell (2005) for a discussion.
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1. Potential technical change PTC, capturing the rate of technical change at the
WTF, constructed with the non-parametric DEA algorithm with CRS. It is de-
ned as:
PTCx(i; t  1; t) =
s
Dt 1O (xit; yit)
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
DtO(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
=
s
yt (xit)
yt 1(xit)
yt (xi;t 1)
yt 1(xi;t 1)
:
(12)
PTC, rst proposed by Fare et al. (1994), isolates the eects of a shifting WTF
(technical change at the WTF) from the eects of eciency changes. As argued
by Ray and Desli (1997), however, PTC is the exact measure of technical change
at the WTF only if the data are in perfect alignment with the CRS restriction.
Otherwise, it convolutes technical change with scale eciency change.
It is also easily noticed that
MCRSx (i; t  1; t) =
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
 PTCx(i; t  1; t)  (13)
 ECx(i; t  1; t) PTCx(i; t  1; t):
Hence, potential technical change is the CRS Malmquist index net of CRS tech-
nical eciency changes.
2. Technical change TC, capturing the rate of technical change at the WTF, con-
structed with the non-parametric DEA algorithm with VRS. It is dened as:
TCx(i; t  1; t) =
s
Dt 1O (xit; yit)
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
DtO(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
=
s
yt (xit)
yt 1(xit)
yt (xi;t 1)
yt 1(xi;t 1)
:
(14)
Just like PTC, the current measure TC isolates the eects of a shifting WTF
(technical change at the WTF) from the eects of eciency changes. As argued
by Ray and Desli (1997), TC is the exact measure of technical change at the
WTF in the general case of variable returns to scale.
It is also easily noticed that
MV RSx (i; t  1; t) =
DtO(xit; yit)
Dt 1O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
 TCx(i; t  1; t)  (15)
 TECx(i; t  1; t) TCx(i; t  1; t):
Hence, technical change is the VRS Malmquist index net of VRS technical e-
ciency changes.
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To see how much noise is introduced into the analysis if CRS decompositions are
used when the technology is truly VRS, the following decomposition is also useful
(Zoo, 2007):
MCRSx (i; t  1; t) = MV RSx (i; t  1; t)RTSx(i; t  1; t) = (16)
= TECx(i; t  1; t) TCx(i; t  1; t)RTSx(i; t  1; t);
where
RTSx(i; t  1; t) =
s
Dt 1O (xit; yit)D
t 1
O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1) D
t
O(xit; yit)D
t
O(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
Dt 1O (xit; yit) D
t 1
O (xi;t 1; yi;t 1)D
t
O(xit; yit)
DtO(xi;t 1; yi;t 1)
:
(17)
Hence, all dierences between the CRS and VRS specications can be lumped
into the returns-to-scale component RTS. The interpretation of this component
is the following (Zoo, 2007): \if RTSx(i; t 1; t) > 1, the rm [country] improves
its performance on a scale basis with regard to the base period productivity
benchmark by exploiting increasing returns to scale and getting closer to the
MPSS [most productive scale size]. Contrarily, RTSx(i; t   1; t) < 1 indicates
that input change carries decreasing returns to scale and the rm [country] is
moving away from optimal scale".
2.5 The \hybrid" approach
Alongside the simplest growth accounting approach and the more involved DEA-based
measurement methods dened above, we shall also consider an intermediate, \hybrid"
approach. It goes along the lines of neoclassical growth accounting in dening TFP
growth as the ratio of output and input growth, with the aggregate production function
being dened as Cobb{Douglas with CRS. It also disentangles technical change along
the WTF from changes in technical eciency, however, by multiplying the TFP growth
rate with the ratio of CRS DEA-based technical eciency measures. Hence, concep-
tually, this hybrid TFP growth measure is a measure of technical change (technical
change at the WTF):
T^FPx(i; t  1; t) = y

t (xit)
yt 1(xi;t 1)

ki;t 1
kit

(18)
or
T^FPx(i; t  1; t) = y

t (xit)
yt 1(xi;t 1)

ki;t 1
kit

hi;t 1
hit
1 
; (19)
where  = 1=3 and yt is the maximum output per worker attainable at time t given
inputs. This number is evaluated from the WTF, computed according to the non-
parametric DEA algorithm with CRS. The CRS assumption is used here for coherence
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with the assumed Cobb{Douglas function which requires CRS as well. As opposed to
TFP growth obtained via neoclassical growth accounting, the \hybrid" approach deals
exclusively with the best practice technology, not the average practice technology.
Inserting the identity yit = D
t
O(xit; yit)yt (xit) into the above denitions, we obtain
the following decomposition of TFP growth, computed with the growth accounting
approach:
TFPx(i; t  1; t) = ECx(i; t  1; t) T^FPx(i; t  1; t); (20)
where ECx(i; t   1; t) is the CRS technical eciency change component dened in
equation (13). This leads to the following output growth decomposition:
yit
yi;t 1
= ECx(i; t  1; t) T^FPx(i; t  1; t)

kit
ki;t 1

hit
hi;t 1
1 
; (21)
known in the growth accounting literature as the\appropriate technology vs. eciency"
output growth decomposition (Basu and Weil, 1998; Jerzmanowski, 2007; Growiec,
2012).
2.6 Information sets
As mentioned in the Introduction, the current paper considers 22 alternative empirical
measurements of\technological progress"(i.e., TFP growth or technical change). Along
one dimension, this multiplicity has been logically grouped above into six categories
diering in methodology. Alternatively, however, they can also be classied into four
categories according to the information set (or vector x) used for computing them.
Intersecting these two dimensions naturally leads to a 4 6 matrix. In its rows we put
the six alternative methods for computing \technological progress", described above,
whereas in its columns we put information sets Ii; i = 1; 2; 3; 4:
 I1: data on OECD countries and US states, including GDP per worker and the
stock of physical capital per worker (xit = kit);
 I2: data on OECD countries only, including GDP per worker as well as physical
and human capital per worker (xit = (kit; hit));
 I3: data on OECD countries and US states, including GDP per worker as well
as physical and human capital per worker (xit = (kit; hit));
 I4: data on OECD countries and US states, including GDP per worker, phys-
ical capital and the stocks of unskilled and skilled labor per worker (xit =
(kit; L
U
it ; L
S
it)).
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Having dened the information sets as above, we immediately note the following nesting
relationships: I1  I3  I4 and I2  I3  I4.
The obvious advantage of using I3 over I1 is that human capital is one of the
important factors driving short-to-medium run output growth and convergence, and
thus omitting it overstates the role of physical capital accumulation (cf. Henderson
and Russell, 2005), and possibly also residual productivity growth.
The advantage of using I3 over I2 comes from the fact that the US are a country
with substantial internal heterogeneity in inputs and output, which always spans the
WTF when considered as a single data point (cf. Growiec, 2012). Hence, we expect
that the WTF will be estimated with less precision when internal heterogeneity of the
US is disregarded than in the case when the particular US states are included in the
dataset as well.9
In the case of I4 we assume that the stocks of unskilled and skilled labor are a
decomposition of total human capital per worker h used in I3 (such that h = LU+LS),
but they enter the aggregate production function separately and thus are allowed to be
imperfectly substitutable. LU captures human capital per worker in the sub-population
with less than secondary education, whereas LS captures human capital per worker in
the sub-population with secondary or higher education. Allowing unskilled and skilled
labor to be imperfectly substitutable in the aggregate production function follows from,
among others, Caselli and Coleman (2006) and empirical evidence in Pandey (2008);
it explains the theoretical advantage of using I4 over I3.
One possible disadvantage of using larger information sets instead of smaller ones
is, on the other hand, that all our macroeconomic variables are measured (constructed)
with substantial error, and some of these errors may cancel out in the aggregate case
but (unwillingly) drive some of our results in the disaggregate case.
Visually, the discussed 4  6 matrix is presented in Table 1. The notation \(C.)"
denotes the countries-only dataset which does not include US state-level data.
Upon reading the table, the following facts are worth noting. First, the measure-
ment of TFP growth across countries according to the Cobb{Douglas-based growth
accounting procedure does not change whether we include US states in the dataset
as well or not. Second, there is (unfortunately) no clear consensus in the literature
on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor which could then
be inserted as a \human capital" aggregate into a Cobb-Douglas production function
with physical and human capital (cf. Caselli and Coleman, 2006). In earlier literature
where human capital was treated as homogenous factor, this elasticity was assumed
9See Growiec (2012) for a discussion on the appropriateness of sub-national disaggregation of the
US and consequences of the idea to further disaggregate other countries, or US states themselves.
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Table 1: Matrix of alternative specications.
Information sets
I1 I2 I3 I4
TFP growth
parametric C-D TFPk TFPk;h
nonparametric Malmquist (CRS) MCRSk M
CRS
k;h (C.) M
CRS
k;h M
CRS
k;LU ;LS
nonparametric Malmquist (VRS) MV RSk M
V RS
k;h (C.) M
V RS
k;h M
V RS
k;LU ;LS
Tech change
hybrid C-D + DEA ]TFP k ]TFP k;h(C.) ]TFP k;h ]TFP k;LU ;LS
nonparametric PTC (CRS) PTCk PTCk;h(C.) PTCk;h PTCk;LU ;LS
nonparametric TC (VRS) TCk TCk;h(C.) TCk;h TCk;LU ;LS
to be innite. We replicate this assumption here to conform with that literature, and
hence our measure of TFP growth boils down to the same number in the cases of all
three information sets I2; I3; I4, resulting in two empty slots in our 4 6 matrix.
Third, the CRS Malmquist index as well as potential technical change PTC com-
puted with I1 are degenerate measures of \technological progress" because the CRS
restriction imposed on a single-factor production function forces it to be linear in
the whole domain. PTCk is thus identically unity for all countries and years, and
MCRSk  ECk: all changes in output per worker that are not proportional to physical
capital accumulation are automatically identied as technical eciency changes. This
must be remembered when interpreting the results.
3 Data
The dataset used in the study covers 19 highly developed OECD countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States, as well as 40 US states.10 The sample covers the period 1970{2000,
in 5-year intervals. Even though the frequency of the data is low, due to the limited
availability of human capital data, it is nevertheless sucient the purposes of the
current study which focuses on medium-to-long run phenomena. All the data we are
using are set in per worker terms.
10We dropped Germany due to the presence of the unication shock in the data, Luxembourg
because of its extraordinarily high output primarily due to specialization and the activity of multina-
tional rms, and the following US states: AK, CO, DC, DE, LA, NV, NH, NM, UT, WV, WY, due
to reasons such as high oil extraction rents, specialization, special tax status, etc. The precise reasons
for these omissions are discussed in the appendix.
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International data on GDP and GDP per worker are taken from the Penn World
Table 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006), and US state-level GDP and GDP
per worker { from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Accounts. The unit of
measurement is the PPP converted US dollar under constant prices as of year 2000.
US state-level data have been multiplicatively adjusted to guarantee internal coherence
with the aggregate US data from the Penn World Tables.
The physical capital series have been constructed using the perpetual inventory
method described, among others, by Caselli (2005) and OECD (2009). We have taken
country-level investment shares as well as government shares from the Penn World
Tables 6.2. The procedure for constructing state-level physical capital data for our
study is more complicated due to missing data. Description of the imputation process
can be found in the appendix.11
Country-level human capital data have been taken from de la Fuente and Domenech
(2006), and US state-level human capital data { from the National Priorities Database.
US state-level data have been imputed when data were missing, using the indirect
evidence from Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007).Unskilled labor LU and
skilled labor LS are measured in \no-schooling equivalents": each worker's labor input
is weighted by her educational attainment. This requires us to split the overall level
of human capital per worker into stocks of \human capital within unskilled labor" and
\within skilled labor".
In sum: from the raw educational attainment data we have constructed the human
capital aggregates using the Mincerian exponential formula with a concave exponent
following Hall and Jones (1999), and more directly, Caselli (2005):
LU =
X
i2SU
 ie
(si); LS =
X
i2SS
 ie
(si); (22)
where SU is the set of groups of people who completed less than 12 years of education
(less than elementary, elementary, less than secondary), SS is the set of groups of people
who completed 12 years of education or more (secondary, less than college, college or
more),  i captures the share of i-th education group in total working-age population
of the given country, si represents years of schooling in i-th education group (cf. de la
11Two alternative methods for computing TFP growth have recently been proposed by Burda and
Severgnini (2008). These methods do not require one to construct the physical capital series. We do
not apply these methods here because capital stocks are necessary for computing all other measures
of technological progress, and because we want to maintain strict comparability between the methods
throughout the whole study.
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Fuente and Domenech, 2006), and (s) is a concave piecewise linear function:
(s) =
8>><>>:
0:134s s < 4;
0:134  4 + 0:101(s  4) s 2 [4; 8);
0:134  4 + 0:101  4 + 0:068(s  8) s  8:
(23)
Furthermore, assuming that everyone who has not completed high school is counted
as unskilled, and everyone who has completed it { as skilled, we compute the overall
scale of human capital per worker as a sum of its two components: h = LU + LS.
Setting the cuto point at high school level seems adequate for OECD economies are
typically technologically advanced and highly capitalized.12 For any further caveats
carried forward by our dataset, please consult the appendix.
4 Main results
4.1 Technological progress across OECD countries, 1970-2000
Keeping in mind all the methodological caveats, let us now pass to the presentation of
our foremost set of empirical results: \technological progress"rates across the 19 OECD
countries in our sample, for the entire period 1970{2000, calculated according to each
of the 22 diverse specications. These results are summarized in Tables 2{3. Please
note that the ultimate row in those tables contains unweighted cross-country averages,
computed as annualized growth rates from the geometric averages of the respective
2000/1970 ratios of technology levels.
From Tables 2{3 we observe that expanding the information set from I1 or I2
towards I4, as well as using more and more general assumptions (i.e., relaxing the
Cobb{Douglas restriction and then relaxing the CRS assumption), generally decreases
the estimates of technological progress rates. This is because by allowing more degrees
of freedom in the production function, we allow it to t the observed patterns of factor
accumulation and output growth better, and so there is less space left for residual
productivity growth.
Even more importantly, already at this point we observe the empirical relevance of
the theoretical distinction between measures of technical change, interpreted as \gen-
uine" technological progress at the WTF, and TFP growth measures, capturing techno-
logical progress actually observed in each given country. The rst observed discrepancy
12It might be set too high if developing economies were to be considered as well, though (cf. Caselli
and Coleman, 2006).
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is that for the former group of measures, \technological progress" is by construction
constrained to non-negative rates. Since our methodology includes the assumption
that all input-output congurations, once used, remain available forever, technological
regress at the frontier is impossible. For the latter group of measures, in contrast,
technological progress can easily be negative: if only output growth is outpaced by the
rate of factor accumulation, then this dierence will be reected in a fall in technical
eciency, and residual technological progress will become negative. We in fact observe
exactly this kind of dynamics in our data in Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. The
second empirical discrepancy is that technical change is positively correlated with ini-
tial physical and human capital stocks (cf. Kumar and Russell, 2002; Jerzmanowski,
2007) and negatively correlated with the rates of subsequent output growth, whereas
TFP growth, due to taking account of eciency changes as well, is much more dis-
persed across countries, and correlates positively both with overall output growth and
with the initial stocks of physical and human capital. All these regularities are visible
in Figure 1.13
Please note that the results presented in Table 2{3 and Figure 1 are averaged over
the entire period 1970{2000. Even though this already gives some information about
the empirical properties of each particular measure of technological progress, allows
for rst comparisons, and gives a clue that certain measures may be more useful for
some purposes and less useful for others, it does not produce enough data for a reliable
analysis of the relative weaknesses and strengths of each measure. This can only be
done with the use of panel data, able to account both for the spatial and the temporal
dimension of the dataset. A table of all 22 measures of technological progress in all ve-
year subperiods (1970{75, 1975{80, 1980{85, 1985{90, 1990{95, 1995{2000) is too long
to be presented here in full, but it is that table which underlies all further analyses.14
Hereafter, wherever we refer to cross{sectional results, we mean the results based on
the set of 19 country-level measures being 1970{2000 averages. When we refer to panel
results, on the other hand, we mean the results based on the set of 19  6 = 114
measures specic for each country and each ve-year period.
13In the lower panel of Figure 1, the stock of physical capital per worker (right axis) is expressed in
US dollars in 2000 prices. The units of human capital per worker (right axis as well) are not directly
interpretable but are comparable across countries and time.
14The table is available from the author upon request.
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Figure 1: Means over TFP growth indexes and technical change measures, and their
relation to growth in output per worker and initial physical and human capital stocks.
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4.2 Accounting for growth in output per worker
We shall now turn to the analysis of most important empirical properties of the alter-
native methods of measurement of technological progress across countries. The rst
of those properties is the ability of the \factor-only component" { capturing growth in
output per worker less technological progress, computed in association with each of the
considered measures, cf. Caselli (2005) { to explain growth in GDP per worker.
The results are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 2. The numbers in Table 4
are unweighted averages over countries (in the cross-sectional case), or over countries
and time periods (in the panel case), of percentages of growth attributed to factor
accumulation and residual technological progress in each of the specications. The
larger is the share of factors in this decomposition, the better is the t of the underlying
production function to the data, and the smaller is the residual component. Please note
that in the case of TFP growth measures, technical eciency changes are included in
\technological progress", whereas in the case of technical change measures, they are
included in the \factor-only component".
Figure 2: Percentage of growth in output per worker attributed to factor accumulation
in each of the specications of residual technological progress.
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Table 4: Percentage of growth in output per worker attributed to factor accumulation
and technological progress in each of the specications.
Panel Cross-section
Factors Technology Factors Technology
(1) TFPk 35,40% 64,60% 40,84% 59,16%
(2) TFPk;h 65,38% 34,62% 71,27% 28,73%
(3) MCRSk 106,70% -6,70% 115,61% -15,61%
(4) MCRSk;h (C.) 61,61% 38,39% 81,88% 18,12%
(5) MCRSk;h 62,32% 37,68% 84,80% 15,20%
(6) MCRSk;LU ;LS 83,06% 16,94% 95,15% 4,85%
(7) MV RSk 42,35% 57,65% 68,70% 31,30%
(8) MV RSk;h (C.) 53,51% 46,49% 71,58% 28,42%
(9) MV RSk;h 47,40% 52,60% 70,17% 29,83%
(10) MV RSk;LU ;LS 70,04% 29,96% 85,40% 14,60%
(11) ]TFP k 28,07% 71,93% 13,66% 86,34%
(12) ]TFP k;h(C.) 41,50% 58,50% 47,59% 52,41%
(13) ]TFP k;h 58,32% 41,68% 57,24% 42,76%
(14) ]TFP k;LU ;LS 52,00% 48,00% 50,13% 49,87%
(15) PTCk 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00%
(16) PTCk;h(C.) 37,72% 62,28% 59,25% 40,75%
(17) PTCk;h 55,25% 44,75% 71,91% 28,10%
(18) PTCk;LU ;LS 69,88% 30,12% 77,43% 22,57%
(19) TCk 25,58% 74,42% 47,61% 52,39%
(20) TCk;h(C.) 36,80% 63,20% 52,74% 47,27%
(21) TCk;h 29,13% 70,87% 49,59% 50,41%
(22) TCk;LU ;LS 50,86% 49,14% 61,09% 38,91%
24
We observe that for any given information set I1{I4, if the \technological progress"
measure includes changes in technical eciency then the \factor-only component" does
a better job in explaining output growth than residual technological progress. The
opposite is true for technical change measures, where it is technological progress which
explains a signicantly larger fraction. The reason for this discrepancy lies with the
treatment of technical eciency change which therefore appears empirically very rele-
vant.15
We also see that generally all factor-only components do a better job in capturing
output growth when the dataset is a cross-section rather than when it is a panel.
One reason for that might be that over the long run, output rises primarily due to
factor accumulation and some frontier productivity growth, whereas in shorter time
periods there is more room for eciency changes, partly because capital stocks cannot
be instantaneously adjusted to the newly available technology. Finally, we also see
that both in the panel and in the cross-section, the largest fraction of output growth is
explained by factors if technological progress is estimated as the CRS Malmquist index
under the full information set I4.
4.3 Accounting for the variance of output growth, correlation
with output growth, and forecast accuracy
Table 5 and Figure 3 summarize a few more empirical characteristics of each of the
measures of technological progress, such as the variance of growth in output per worker
accounted by the factor-only component, correlations with output growth, and forecast
accuracy if output growth is forecast solely with the factor-only component. Obviously,
each of these characteristics captures a dierent decomposition, and thus { even though
each statistic might be understood as some measure of \goodness of t" { they cannot
be used directly for picking winners and losers, or for judging which measure of tech-
nological progress is generally the \most appropriate" one in cross-country empirical
applications. It clearly depends on the particular question asked and the assump-
tions made in each particular study, some of which will be discussed in the following
paragraphs as well as in subsection 4.5.
We do see several regularities, though, complementing the knowledge we already
have from the theoretical denition of each of our measures.16 The regularities are the
15MCRSk and PTCk are excluded from Figure 2 because they imply PTCk  1 and MCRSk  ECk
and thus are not interesting from the point of view of the current comparison.
16MCRSk and PTCk are excluded from Figure 3 because they imply PTCk  1 and MCRSk  ECk
and thus are not interesting from the point of view of the current comparison.
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following:
Figure 3: Selected characteristics of the 22 measures of technological progress.
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1. The TFP growth measure derived from growth accounting is very strongly cor-
related with output growth, both in the cross-section and in the panel, which
suggests a possible problem of an inappropriate functional form. This measure
leaves a quite large fraction of output growth to be explained by factor accu-
mulation, which is a generally desirable property, but is largely outperformed by
several Malmquist indices in this respect.
2. Malmquist indexes are visibly less correlated with output growth, especially in the
cross-section, and leave an even larger fraction of output growth to be explained
by factor accumulation.
3. The hybrid parametric{non-parametric TFP growth measure is very weakly cor-
related with output growth, especially in the temporal dimension. The factor-only
component associated with this measure of \technological progress" does a bad
job in explaining GDP's rate of growth, but a very good job in explaining its vari-
ance across countries and time. The fact that hybrid TFP growth accounts for
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Table 5: Selected characteristics of the 22 measures of technological progress.
Levels P Levels C Corr. P Corr. C Variance Var+cov MAE RMSE AIC BIC
(1) TFPk 35,40% 40,84% 0,964 0,901 7,58% 11,42% 0,0676 0,0074 -451,4 -438,6
(2) TFPk;h 65,38% 71,27% 0,912 0,752 18,40% 12,03% 0,0580 0,0057 -460,6 -435,0
(3) MCRSk 106,70% 115,61% 0,673 0,012 68,21% 34,27% 0,0537 0,0051 -486,6 -473,8
(4) MCRSk;h (C.) 61,61% 81,88% 0,834 0,234 33,90% 17,21% 0,0627 0,0061 -453,1 -427,6
(5) MCRSk;h 62,32% 84,80% 0,833 0,205 36,32% 15,15% 0,0626 0,0064 -448,7 -423,2
(6) MCRS
k;LU ;LS
83,06% 95,15% 0,863 0,267 30,20% 8,59% 0,0607 0,0059 -440,5 -402,2
(7) MV RSk 42,35% 68,70% 0,790 0,041 46,78% 19,28% 0,0722 0,0079 -444,3 -431,5
(8) MV RSk;h (C.) 53,51% 71,58% 0,808 0,186 39,37% 18,06% 0,0674 0,0068 -443,0 -417,4
(9) MV RSk;h 47,40% 70,17% 0,784 0,077 52,14% 16,24% 0,0729 0,0081 -426,8 -401,2
(10) MV RS
k;LU ;LS
70,04% 85,40% 0,879 0,235 25,17% 11,38% 0,0605 0,0059 -441,7 -403,4
(11) T^ FPk 28,07% 13,66% 0,407 0,655 84,66% 77,12% 0,0630 0,0053 -481,9 -469,1
(12) T^FPk;h(C.) 41,50% 47,59% 0,399 0,657 94,15% 74,11% 0,0525 0,0049 -475,6 -450,1
(13) T^FPk;h 58,32% 57,24% 0,148 0,706 108,05% 92,91% 0,0388 0,0024 -541,4 -515,9
(14) T^FPk;LU ;LS 52,00% 50,13% 0,070 0,453 114,56% 97,11% 0,0424 0,0027 -514,0 -475,7
(15) PTCk 100,00% 100,00% 0,072 0,088 100,00% 100,00% 0,0000 0,0000 N/A N/A
(16) PTCk;h(C.) 37,72% 59,25% 0,322 -0,403 100,52% 79,29% 0,0535 0,0050 -473,1 -447,6
(17) PTCk;h 55,25% 71,91% 0,080 -0,432 109,52% 96,02% 0,0387 0,0024 -543,3 -517,8
(18) PTCk;LU ;LS 69,88% 77,43% 0,156 -0,429 101,64% 93,67% 0,0264 0,0014 -577,0 -538,7
(19) TCk 25,58% 47,61% -0,072 -0,410 146,82% 103,80% 0,0638 0,0061 -470,0 -457,2
(20) TCk;h(C.) 36,80% 52,74% 0,332 -0,365 99,08% 78,38% 0,0544 0,0051 -471,2 -445,6
(21) TCk;h 29,13% 49,59% -0,043 -0,441 134,82% 101,81% 0,0608 0,0053 -467,8 -442,2
(22) TCk;LU ;LS 50,86% 61,09% 0,140 -0,478 106,43% 93,23% 0,0424 0,0028 -511,9 -473,6
Legend:
 \Levels" { percentage of total growth in output per worker explained by factor accumulation. Index P denotes
averages over a panel of 5-year intervals spanning 1970{2000, index C denotes the cross-sectional average.
 \Corr." { correlation of the technological progress measures with growth in output per worker. Index P denotes
averages over a panel of 5-year intervals spanning 1970{2000, index C denotes the cross-sectional average.
 \Variance" denotes the percentage of variance of output growth rates explained by the factor-only component,
assuming that growth in output per worker equals the technological progress factor times the factor accumulation
factor.
 \Var+cov" is the Caselli (2005) measure of success { the ratio of variance of the factor-only component plus
one covariance of the factor-only component and technological progress (numerator) over the variance of output
growth rates (denominator). Both \variance" measures have been computed using a panel of 5-year intervals
spanning 1970{2000.
 MAE and RMSE denote, respectively, the mean absolute error and the root of mean square error, obtained
when growth in output per worker is predicted ex post as the growth rate of the factor-only component.
 AIC and BIC denote, respectively, the Akaike and the Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion for the above
forecast.
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a large fraction of dierences in growth performances suggests that technological
progress at the WTF is highly non-neutral and targets selected factor ratios only.
Standard growth accounting techniques, assuming a uniform technical change
pattern, should therefore fall short in this respect.
4. Non-parametric technical change measures (PTC, TC) are robustly negatively
correlated with output growth in the cross section. This is probably because of
the convergence process in the data and the fact that technological progress is
observed mostly in the domain of high physical and human capital intensities
(cf. Kumar and Russell, 2002; Jerzmanowski, 2007). Its factor-only component
explains a very large part of variance of output growth across countries and time,
corroborating the nding that technological progress at the WTF is highly non-
neutral.
5. The most striking general nding from Figure 3 is that all measures of TFP growth
are highly correlated with output growth17 but their factor-only components do
a bad job in explaining its variance, whereas measures of technical change are
weakly correlated with output growth (even negatively in the cross-section) and
their factor-only components do a good job in explaining its variance.
6. Enlarging the information set by including further factors of production increases
the percentage of output growth explained by factors and lowers the correlation of
each given measure of technological progress with output growth. This regularity
justies the inclusion and the subsequent decomposition of human capital in the
production function.
7. Increasing the precision of WTF estimates by adding auxiliary US state-level
data to the dataset (see Growiec, 2012) generally improves the empirical prop-
erties of most considered measures. In particular, it increases the percentage of
variance explained by the factor-only component associated with a given measure
of technical change; this regularity does not apply to TFP growth measures.
8. The factor-only component does the best job in predicting output growth (that
is, MAE and RMSE are minimized) when \technological progress" is dened as
PTC, taking into account the decomposition of human capital into unskilled and
skilled labor.
17It is true particularly in the temporal dimension; in the cross-section, this correlation falls down
to 0,041{0,267 for Malmquist indices.
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9. Other things equal, PTC is superior to TC (as judged by the MAE and RMSE)
in predicting output growth with the factor-only component. This suggests that
in international data, returns to scale should be close to constant on average.
10. Average forecast accuracy of the factor-only component is better for measures of
technical change than for measures of TFP growth. There is however a trade-o
in accuracy of forecasting mean output growth which is better in the latter case,
and its deviations from the mean, which is better in the former case.
4.4 Pairwise correlations
A further piece of information is conveyed in Tables 6{7, containing pairwise (Pearson)
correlation coecients among the 10 measures of TFP growth and the 12 measures
of technical change, constructed for our dataset of OECD countries. The graphical
layout of Tables 6{7 emphasizes the fact that what matters most for the \character" of
a measure is the methodology of its construction, not the information set upon which
it is based. The parametric TFP growth measures are strongly correlated with each
other, and so are all Malmquist indexes (irrespective of the CRS/VRS assumption),
all hybrid TFP growth measures, and all PTC/TC measures (again, irrespective of the
CRS/VRS assumption). The correlation across methodologies is much less pronounced
and in several cases it is actually negative.
Still, on the basis of evidence discussed above, the auxiliary use of US state-level
data seems helpful.
Interestingly, the negative correlations between hybrid TFP growth measures and
non-parametric technical change indexes appear in the cross-sectional dimension but
disappear in the panel. More generally, panel correlations are generally larger, with the
exception of correlations between PTC and TC measures which are larger in the cross-
section. The reason is that most measures of \technological progress" move in a more
or less parallel fashion across time (but vary largely across countries). Two possible
explanations of this regularity are the following: (i) technological progress at the WTF
gradually trickles down over time to more backward countries as well, counteracting
the negative cross-sectional correlation between measures of technological progress in
each country and progress at the WTF, and (ii) function misspecication errors are
repeated over time giving rise to \country-specic eects", creating a positive time-
series correlation able to oset the negative cross-sectional correlation in the panel.
We suppose that both these eects can potentially be important.
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4.5 Corollaries from the main results
The principal conclusion from the results presented above is that for dierent purposes,
dierent measures of \technological progress" should be used, and particular attention
should be paid to the distinction between TFP growth and technical change because of
the dierential treatment of technical eciency changes. If the objective is to account
for the average output growth rate across countries or time, then TFP growth measures
should be used, and in this case the most successful measure appears to be the CRS
Malmquist index computed using the information set I4.18
If the objective is, on the other hand, to nd the sources of variation of output
growth rates across countries and time, most promising are the measures of technical
change, in particular the ones based on the information set I4. If one wants to minimize
ex post prediction errors when predicting output growth with growth of the factor-
only component, then PTC computed with I4 should be the most appropriate choice.
Generally, one always has to draw a rm line between measures of technical change and
measures of TFP growth, where the latter one includes shifts in technical eciency as
well. Both types of measures are distinct by denition, negatively correlated with each
other, and yield diverging results.
Another conclusion stemming from the study is that the variances and correla-
tions are signicantly dierent in the temporal dimension than in the cross-sectional
dimension. One reason is that there is a lot of variation in technical eciency across
countries, but this index changes relatively slowly in time. A dierent reason could
be that there are \country-specic eects" due to production function misspecication
active in the panel.
Yet another lesson here is that increasing the precision of WTF estimates helps
in increasing all our \goodness of t" measures. Obviously, this applies strongly to
adding a human capital measure into the production function. Interestingly enough,
however, this applies even more strongly to decomposing human capital into skilled and
unskilled labor, and we also record visible increases in our \goodness of t" measures
when the dataset is enlarged by using auxiliary US state-level data on top of our OECD
country-level data (cf. Growiec, 2012), even though these numbers are measured with
admittable error.
18It may be surprising that the VRS Malmquist index is found somewhat inferior to the CRS variant
in the considered dataset. Without implying, let us suggest that a possible reason behind this result
might be a combination of approximately constant returns to scale at the cross-country level and
substantial measurement error.
32
4.6 A comparison with van Biesebroeck (2007)
An insightful reader might notice that the current article has the same objective as the
one carried out by van Biesebroeck (2007), that is to compare the relative strengths
and weaknesses of several alternative measures of factor productivity and technologi-
cal progress. There are a few decisive dierences between these two papers, though.
First, van Biesebroeck's paper focuses primarily on measuring inputs and outputs of
individual rms, and ours { of countries. Second, his study is based on articial data,
and ours is based on real-world data. While his approach has the relative advantage
of providing a clear-cut metric of \distance to reality" { because he knows exactly his
data-generating process and we do not { it also has the disadvantage that the proper-
ties of that data-generating process might be actually distant from the properties of a
process generating real-world data, if it exists at all. Indeed, van Biesebroeck's data are
generated from a model economy endowed with a Cobb{Douglas production function,
deformed by a number of stochastic shocks. If the world is not fundamentally Cobb{
Douglas, however, his results will be biased in favor of methods where this functional
form is explicitly assumed, such as his parametric stochastic frontier estimations.19
Third, most of the methods for computing technological progress considered by van
Biesebroeck (2007) require the researcher to estimate the parameters of the production
function and/or use data on the labor share in GDP, which we intentionally set aside
in our analysis. In result, our study might be based on wrong calibrations, but for sure
it will not face the problems of endogeneity of production decisions and equilibrium
pricing behavior. Fourth, van Biesebroeck assumes the technology frontier to be the
same for all periods of time. While that might be a legitimate assumption in industrial
(micro)economics with relatively short time spans, it is certainly not in macroeconomic
productivity analysis. Therefore in the current study we allow the WTF to shift in time,
and we actually identify 20 out of 22 technological progress measures with appropriate
functions of these shifts.
5 Conclusion
The current article has been the rst one to bring together 22 approaches to the mea-
surement of \technological progress" across countries, providing a synthetic, numerical
19In particular, one of van Biesebroeck's conclusions is that parametric methods have a clear ad-
vantage over non-parametric ones when factors of production are measured with error. In his study,
though, measurement error is assumed to be centered around a Cobb{Douglas production function,
which likely drives this result.
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assessment of their empirical properties on the basis of a few standard, easily inter-
pretable statistics. The considered measures are based on the neoclassical growth ac-
counting approach, nonparametric frontier analysis (DEA), and a \hybrid" parametric-
nonparametric approach. The frontier approach enabled us to construct the World
Technology Frontier (WTF) and subsequently control for changes in countries' techni-
cal ineciency. Having discussed a range of denitional issues, we have investigated
empirically what fraction of total growth in GDP per worker and its variance in the
group of 19 OECD countries in 1970{2000 is captured by the \technological progress"
(residual productivity growth) component in each of the specications. We have also
computed the correlations of these residual measures with growth in output per worker
and calculated the mean ex post prediction errors (MAE, RMSE) when future output
growth is predicted as the implied factor-only component.
The results of this investigation indicate that (i) it is crucial to distinguish be-
tween measures of TFP growth, capturing technological progress actually observed in
each given country, from measures of technical change proper, capturing technologi-
cal progress at the WTF, (ii) it is generally worthwhile to use more information for
constructing the WTF, in particular to allow for imperfect substitutability between
skilled and unskilled labor and to use US state-level data apart from OECD country-
level data, and (iii) above all, there is no unique optimal method of measurement of
technological progress, hence the method should always be selected in accordance with
the analyzed research question and special attention should be paid to the treatment
of technical eciency changes (shifts in the distance to the WTF).
The current study can be extended in numerous ways, including the following ones.
The rst idea would be to compare the predictions regarding the cross-country mea-
sures of technological progress from deterministic nonparametric frontier models with
their counterparts from stochastic parametric frontier models, preferably based on the
translog production function specication (cf. Koop, Osiewalski and Steel, 1999, 2000;
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Growiec et al., 2011) as well as with neoclassical growth
accounting based on the CES aggregate production function specication with factor-
augmenting technical change (cf. Duy and Papageorgiou, 2000; Klump, McAdam
and Willman, 2007; Chirinko, 2008). Another question which could be addressed is,
how large is the uncertainty in the non-parametric estimations of the WTF, under-
lying the measures of technological progress discussed above. This question could be
addressed with the use of bootstrap techniques for non-parametric frontier models. Yet
another idea would be to use dierent datasets to see if the results obtained here still
go through.
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Data appendix
The original dataset covers 21 highly developed OECD countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and the United States, as well as 50 US states plus the District of Columbia:
AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA,
ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK,
OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, WY.
We have however decided to drop Luxembourg and the DC from our analysis be-
cause of the strong indication that these entities' productivity might be signicantly
overestimated because of workers commuting from outside of the territory (such as
Belgium and France for Luxembourg, or Virginia and Maryland for DC).20 We have
also removed Germany from our sample because of the unication shock present in the
data.
Furthermore, since the DEA method is extremely sensitive to outliers, we have
also decided to drop US states with largest long-term average mining shares in the
gross state product. There is an indication that productivity of these states might be
overestimated since their gross state product encompasses substantial resource rents
which are not captured in the estimated production function. These states are Alaska,
Colorado, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.21 We
also dropped Delaware and New Hampshire as small, specialized economies with com-
paratively unusual tax systems.22
20Admittedly, this caveat applies to some other EU countries and US states as well. The larger is the
country or state, however, and the more likely is commuting to be bi-directional, the less important
this problem becomes for our aggregate results.
21The sparsely populated oil-producing Alaska is probably the most remarkable among these states.
With its mining share in GDP peaking at 50% in 1981, the state turned out to span the WTF any
time it entered the estimation procedure, subsequently lowering the eciency factor in most other US
states by as much as 10-30 percentage points.
22In particular, Delaware is known as a within-US \tax haven" and a major center of credit card
issuers. When included in the sample, both Delaware and New Hampshire tended to span the tech-
nology frontier at almost all years 1970{2000. Also, the number of frontier observations increased
markedly after these states had been dropped. We consider this fact to be an indication that they
indeed were outliers in our sample.
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The time span of our analysis is 1970{2000, and the estimations are run in 5-year
intervals. The crucial bottleneck here is the availability of schooling variables which are
only measured in 5-year intervals. Most other data were available in annual frequency
and a longer period.
The data we are using are set in per worker terms. This means that we abstract
from the issues of labor market participation which may result in additional per capita
productivity dierences, and of the variation in hours worked per worker which means
that our analysis convolutes productivity dierences with labor-leisure choice of the
employees: ceteris paribus, an increase in hours worked per worker will be reected
by increases in \productivity" as we measure it even though technology as such is
unchanged. It is however dicult to nd reliable and comparable data on hours worked
per capita across both OECD countries and US states which would date back at least
until 1970.
For international data on GDP and GDP per worker, we use the Penn World Table
6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006), available for 1960-2003. For state-level GDP
and GDP per worker, we use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional
Accounts, available for 1963-2007. The unit of measurement is the PPP converted US
dollar under constant prices as of year 2000. Since, to our surprise, we have found
discrepancies up to 15% (in extreme cases) in the total number of workers employed
across the US in the two datasets, and since international data are given priority in
the analysis, the BEA data on GDP per worker have been proportionally adjusted to
guarantee internal coherence with the aggregate US data from the PennWorld Tables.23
The physical capital series have been constructed using the perpetual inventory
method described, among others, by Caselli (2005) and OECD (2009). We have taken
country-level investment shares as well as government shares from the Penn World
Tables 6.2. There are two polar standpoints as for the role of government in capital
accumulation: one is that government spending is all consumption, and the other one
is that it is all investment. We have taken an intermediate stance here, assuming that
the government invests the same share of its GDP share as the private economy does.
Under this assumption, the overall (private and public) investment share is s=(1   g)
where s is the private investment share and g is the government share. Furthermore,
following Caselli (2005), we assumed an annual depreciation rate of 6%. For state-level
government shares, we compiled a dataset from primary sources at the US Census
Bureau. Since the period of available data is 1992-2006 only, we extrapolated govern-
ment shares backward in time using state-level averages and the long-run trend from
23As a side eect, this adjustment helps solve the problem of the discontinuity between 1996 and
1997 in BEA data on the gross state product, arising due to a change in measurement methodology.
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the overall US economy. Unfortunately, there are no data on state-level investment
shares apart from those computed by Turner, Tamura and Mulholland (2008) which
are however not publicly available. Knowing that this introduces substantial error
but not being able to obtain better proxies, we have imputed that state-level private
investment shares are equal to the US countrywide private investment share.
Country-level human capital data have been taken from de la Fuente and Domenech
(2006) { D-D hereafter. The raw variables are shares of population aged 25 or above
having completed primary, some secondary, secondary, some tertiary, tertiary, or post-
graduate education. The considered dataset is of 5-year frequency only and it ends in
1995. Among all possible education attainment databases, the D-D dataset has been
given priority due to our trust in its superior quality. The original D-D series has been
extrapolated forward to the year 2000 using Cohen and Soto (2007) schooling data as
a predictor for the trends. Neither Barro and Lee (2001) nor Cohen and Soto (2007)
data could be used directly for this purpose because neither of them is (even roughly)
in agreement with the D-D dataset { nor with each other { in the period where all
datasets oer data points.
US state-level human capital data have been taken from the National Priorities
Database. Here, the variables are shares of population aged 25 or above having com-
pleted less than high school, high school, some college, college, or having obtained the
Associate, Bachelor, or Master degree (the last category covering above-Master edu-
cation as well). These data are available for 1995-2006 only. We have extrapolated
the observed trends in the educational composition of the populations backwards using
US country-wide trends documented in D-D and state-level dierences in the period
when the data were available. The aggregate state-level quantities of human capital
have been, on the other hand, taken from Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier
(2007). At the international level, cumulative years of schooling at each level of edu-
cation have been taken from D-D and supplemented with data from country-specic
web resources wherever necessary. The US state-level education attainment data have
also been adjusted to guarantee comparability with D-D data.24
From the raw educational attainment data we have constructed the human capital
aggregates using the Mincerian exponential formula with a concave exponent following
24We have found a roughly steady surplus of 8 percentage points in the share of population with
less than high school completed in the National Priorities Database as compared to D-D, compensated
by a shortage of 5.3 pp. in high school graduates, and of 2.7 pp. in the \some college" category. We
have thus added/subtracted these values from the US state-level gures to guarantee coherence at the
aggregate US level, keeping in mind that this procedure could have introduced some additional error.
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Hall and Jones (1999), and more directly, Caselli (2005):
LU =
X
i2SU
 ie
(si); LS =
X
i2SS
 ie
(si); (24)
where SU is the set of groups of people who completed less than 12 years of education
(less than elementary, elementary, less than secondary), SS is the set of groups of people
who completed 12 years of education or more (secondary, less than college, college or
more),  i captures the share of i-th education group in total working-age population
of the given country, si represents years of schooling in i-th education group (cf. de la
Fuente and Domenech, 2006), and (s) is a concave piecewise linear function:
(s) =
8>><>>:
0:134s s < 4;
0:134  4 + 0:101(s  4) s 2 [4; 8);
0:134  4 + 0:101  8 + 0:068(s  8) s  8:
(25)
The overall human capital index can be computed as the sum of unskilled and skilled
labor: H = LU + LS. We have however allowed these two types of labor to be im-
perfectly substitutable, and enter the production function separately. The perfect
substitution case where only total human capital matters is an interesting special case
of our generalized formulation; the data do not support this assumption, however.
Special attention should be paid to the cuto point of 12 years of schooling de-
lineating unskilled and skilled labor. It is roughly equivalent to the requirement of
having completed secondary education to be skilled: secondary education is usually
completed after 12 years of schooling (13 in some countries). We have thus assumed
that everyone who has not completed high school is counted as unskilled, and who has
{ as skilled. This cuto point seems adequate for OECD economies in our sample {
which are usually technologically advanced and highly capitalized. Another measure-
ment problem which may potentially appear but which we do not consider a major
obstacle here given our sample choice, is that schooling quality at dierent grades may
vary across countries and states. This pertains both to the split between skilled and
unskilled population and the estimates of aggregate human capital. Controlling for
this heterogeneity is left for further research.
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